CHINA'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY AGAINST THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION CARBON TAX SCHEME: A TWO-STAGE GAME MODEL ANALYSIS
Han; Q; Song N(宋楠); Song; N; Lu; B; Hua; GW; Du; HS
刊名ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
2015
卷号14期号:8页码:1803-1811
关键词aviation carbon tax (ACT) equilibrium optimal strategy two-stage game
学科分类Environmental Sciences & Ecology
文章类型Article
英文摘要A two-stage game model is proposed in this paper to study how China can best respond to the European Union (EU) Aviation Carbon Tax Scheme. Four possible strategies of China can be chosen, including "non-resistance", "refusal of pay", "retaliatory duties" and "credible threat". The analytic result shows that the strategy "refusal of pay" makes a consensus with the Chinese policy as an optimal strategy for China. The main contribution of this paper is to study a heated divergence on aviation carbon tax by using a two-stage game model.
类目[WOS]Environmental Sciences
收录类别SCI
WOS记录号WOS:000366333400004
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文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://ir.ihep.ac.cn/handle/311005/229094
专题中国科学院高能物理研究所_管理与技术支持_期刊论文
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Han,Q,Song N,et al. CHINA'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY AGAINST THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION CARBON TAX SCHEME: A TWO-STAGE GAME MODEL ANALYSIS[J]. ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT JOURNAL,2015,14(8):1803-1811.
APA Han.,Q.,宋楠.,Song.,N.,...&HS.(2015).CHINA'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY AGAINST THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION CARBON TAX SCHEME: A TWO-STAGE GAME MODEL ANALYSIS.ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT JOURNAL,14(8),1803-1811.
MLA Han,et al."CHINA'S OPTIMAL STRATEGY AGAINST THE EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION CARBON TAX SCHEME: A TWO-STAGE GAME MODEL ANALYSIS".ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 14.8(2015):1803-1811.
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